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Biological weapons and biological terrorism have recently come into focus due to the
deliberate release of Bacillus anthracis via mail delivered in the USA. Since the 1930s,
biological weapons have been developed in a number of countries. In 1975, the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention entered into force; this prohibits the use of these
weapons and has been signed by a large majority of countries (144). Unfortunately,
several countries failed to respect this treaty. The Soviet Union continued and expanded
its biological weapons program, and after the Gulf War it was revealed that Iraq also had
an extensive biological weapons program. Large-scale deliberate release of, Bacillus
anthracis, for example, or an epidemic following a release of smallpox virus, would
have a devastating effect. This has motivated the world community to strengthen the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention with a control mechanism which has, as yet,
not been successful. Sweden, like other countries, is enhancing its preparedness with
regard to stocks of antibiotics and vaccines, related to these improving the diagnostics
these and similar agents, and is setting up an epidemiologic task force that can be used in
infectious disease emergencies such as the deliberate release of biological warfare agents.
International cooperation in this area has to be enhanced, not least in the European
Union.
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B I O L O G I C A L W A R F A R E
Biological weapons are microorganisms, in parti-
cular bacteria, virus and fungi, but also other
organisms, that can be deliberately dispersed to
incapacitate or cause disease and death to humans,
animals or plants. Biological warfare agents can be
natural or genetically modified. Genetic modifica-
tion of microorganisms is common and is worri-
some if the technique is misused, as the progress in
cell and molecular biology technology has opened
new and dangerous possibilities. Here, we define
bioterrorism as either the threat of use or deliber-
ate use of biological agents to cause harm or dis-
ease by criminals, including terrorists, individuals
or groups with political, economic, religious, eco-
logical or other ideological motivations.
Microorganisms, and also toxins, have been
used for such purposes for a long time. This mis-
use has its background in the fact that many of
these pathogens are inexpensive and relatively
easy to produce if one has basic microbiological
training. Only small quantities are required to
cause large and terrifying effects. Another impor-
tant factor is that the effects of these types of
biological warfare agents are not immediate; as
there is an incubation period, there will be a short
or long time delay, which makes it simple to carry
out a covert attack. There could also be dangerous
secondary effects, due to the dramatic overbur-
dening of the healthcare system, demands on other
community services, and the risk of further epi-
demic spread of the disease.
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The idea of using microorganisms as warfare
agents has a very long history. An early example of
this was the contamination of water wells with
dead corpses of humans or animals to prevent the
enemy from obtaining fresh drinking water. It is
believed that the plague (the black death) in the
Middle Ages started in Europe when that affliction
spread among the Mongolian tartars besieging the
Genoese city of Caffa on the Crimea in 1346. When
the city could not be taken, the attackers catapulted
corpses of their soldiers who had died of plague
over the city walls. In this way, an epidemic was
initiated which then spread via those with devas-
tating effects those who fled by ship from the
Crimea to the Mediterranean region and further
up throughout Europe. Another important exam-
ple is the fact that British military forces in eastern
North America gave hostile Native Americans
blankets previously used by people who had died
of smallpox as presents, in order to spread the
disease. This resulted in an epidemic among the
Native Americans, who had no protection against
the disease [1].
Microbiological science made big advances in
the first half of the 20th century. In some circles,
ideas were being developed concerning how these
scientific developments could be used for military
purposes. It was during the 1930s and 1940s that
this resulted in the expansion and development of
biological weapons programs. Such programs
were initiated in Canada, France, the UK, Poland,
the Soviet Union, the USA, and several other
countries [1]. The Japanese also developed biolo-
gical weapons during this period; they tested them
on large numbers of prisoners of war, and used
them against civilians in China. The Allies devel-
oped biological weapons because intelligence
information had indicated that Germany and
Japan already had such weapons. During World
War II, the USA, the UK and Canada worked
primarily with Bacillus anthracis as a biological
warfare agent. The US program on offensive bio-
logical weapons continued until it was finally
terminated during the Nixon administration in
1969, in order to make possible an international
agreement to ban biological weapons. A treaty
prohibiting the acquisition, development, storage
and production of biological and toxin weapons
was completed in 1972; however, all references to
control procedures had been deleted from the text,
as they were not be accepted by the Soviet Union.
Most countries, numbering 144 at present, have
signed and ratified the Biological and Toxin Weap-
ons Convention (BTWC), which entered into force
in 1975. Countries that have not yet done so
include some in the Middle East. Many countries
believed, when the Convention was signed, that
biological weapons no longer constituted a pro-
blem, and several states drastically cut down on
their biological defense research. In retrospect, it
has been shown that the Soviet Union, in spite of
its ratification of the Convention, initiated a dra-
matic expansion of its biological weapons program
[1,2].
Biological weapons have not so far been used on
a large scale during warfare between states. One
reason for this is that the military authorities have
no experience of their use, and have found it
difficult to calculate the effects in advance of
use. Furthermore, they have believed that reprisals
from the enemy would be too severe. Today’s
rogue states or terrorist organizations do not, per-
haps, see the same limitations.
B I O L O G I C A L W A R F A R E A G E N T S
Many pathogens or toxins could be used for war-
fare or terrorism. Examples of pathogens are the
smallpox, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, yellow
fever, Ebola and Marburg viruses, and the bacteria
B. anthracis, Yersinia pestis, and Francisella tularen-
sis. Biological warfare agents would ideally be
spread as an aerosol to maximize the effects. Other
ways could be via food or water. Biological war-
fare agents could be spread using equipment for
producing aerosols, such as spray devices, or via
bombs or missiles. They could also be dispersed
from aeroplanes, ships, or vehicles, or, as we have
recently seen, via letters. In producing this type of
agent, it is important that it is stable enough to
survive environmental stress during dissemina-
tion. The particle size is also important, and should
be 1–10 mm to allow good penetration into the
lungs of humans [2].
In the Soviet Union, there were more than 60 000
people involved in research on, and development
and production of, biological weapons in several
organizations, including the Ministry of Defense,
the Ministry of Agriculture, and the so-called
Biopreparat [3]. Large amounts of microorganisms
were tested and produced for use weapons, such
as B. anthracis, Y. pestis, F. tularensis, and smallpox
(variola), Venezuelan equine encephalitis and
hemorrhagic fever viruses [4].
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Especially worrisome is that large amounts of
smallpox virus, many thousands of kilos, were
produced for use weapons, use as because this
virus and disease had been eradicated during the
1970s, and vaccinations are no longer done [5].
There is also an international agreement through
the WHO that the remaining virus stocks should
be stored in only two official laboratories, one in
the USA and one in Russia. Discussions are in
progress at the WHO, to the effect that the remain-
ing stocks should be destroyed after a certain
period, during which essential research could be
performed under WHO control. Another problem
is that there are suspicions that more countries or
groups could still have small quantities of small-
pox virus.
It is well known that Iraq, since the 1970s, has
had a well developed biological weapons pro-
gram, including bombs and SCUD missiles filled
with anthrax bacteria, botulinum toxin and afla-
toxin [6]. This was of major concern during and
after the Gulf War. Following the war, the United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), under
its chairman, the Swedish ambassador Rolf Eke´us,
made great efforts worked hard to identify and
destroy facilities used for producing biological
weapons. Iraq refused further UN inspections in
1998 as a result of US and UK bombing of Bagh-
dad. The new United Nations Commission
(UNMOVIC), under its chairman Hans Blix, has
so far been unable to resume inspections. Of the
Iraqi biological weapons program consisted/con-
sists. As far as is known, based on Iraqi declara-
tions, of agents such as B. anthracis, botulinum
toxin, ricin and aflatoxin. The extent of the pro-
gram is still not today. There are indications that as
many as ten countries, as well as Russia and Iraq,
are trying to acquire or have a program for
research and development of biological weapons.
The proliferation of knowledge or technology
that can be misused to develop biological weapons
is today a serious problem. Internationally, work is
therefore in progress to strengthen the BTWC a
control regime, and by including to strengthen the
existing export control arrangement, according to
the Australia Group, which excludes microorgan-
isms or equipment that can be misused. It is
important to limit the proliferation of knowledge
from the former Soviet biological weapons pro-
gram: Western economic support to Soviet scien-
tists may prevent them from making their
knowledge available to rogue states that are trying
to acquire biological weapons. In Sweden, the
questions connected with biological weapons have
recently been highlighted in the latest Defense Bills
and by the Parliamentary Defense Commission’s
reports.
B I O T E R R O R I S M
The list of possible biological warfare agents that
could be used by potential terrorists or disturbed
individuals is long, and the threat of use is still
very real and serious [3,7–13]. In 1984, a religious
sect in Oregon in the western USA spread Salmo-
nella typhimurium bacteria in a number of salad
bars in order to cause disease; it is theorized that
this was doue so that members of the sect might
win win a local election. This deliberate release
resulted in 751 cases of disease [13,14]. Another
organization with religious/political motives, the
Japanese Aum Shinrikyo, which dispersed the
chemical nerve gas sarin in Tokyo’s underground
railway in 1995, causing 12 deaths and hundreds
of injured individuals, also had a biological weap-
ons program. Anthrax bacteria were spread from a
building in Tokyo, but without success, as it was
shown later that the bacterial strain used was not
virulent [14]. The sect also tried to acquire of Ebola
virus during the epidemic in Kikwit, Zaire in 1995,
but this was not accomplished.
Since September and October 2001, when letters
containing B. anthracis were sent within the USA,
the situation has changed. In total, 22 persons have
been diagnosed with B. anthracis infection, either
cutaneous or pulmonary, So far, five of 11 patients
with confirmed pulmonary anthrax infection have
died [15]. Anthrax bacteria have been further
spread via the postal distribution system in the
Washington area, and this has resulted in contam-
ination in a number of localities, for example, the
US State Department, the Pentagon, and news
media such as ABC, NBC and the New York
Times. At the same time, a large number of letters,
apporoximately 12 000, with suspected contents
were discovered and had to be analyzed. Most
of these contained some type of powder, but no
anthrax. The situation in the Washington area
became very difficult when large quantities of mail
and a number of facilities had been contaminated.
The same situation, with large numbers of suspect
letters, has occurred in many countries, including
Sweden, where more than 400 suspect letters have
been identified and analyzed.
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The recent events in the USA prove that there
are people or organizations prepared to use viru-
lent microorganisms to cause disease and death.
Before these events, this was a possible scenario,
but the situation is now an actuality [3]. Although
the US anthrax incident has caused five deaths and
accounts for a great economic loss, the direct
effects are limited. This can be compared to the
mass destruction that B. anthracis would cause if
dispersed on a large scale as an aerosol in a city, in
the ventilation system of a large building, or in a
metro system. The casualties would then amount
to thousands or even more. The hospital system
would be overwhelmed, and large stocks of anti-
biotics would be necessary to limit the conse-
quences. These consequences would be even
worse if smallpox virus was used. It should be
noted that the technical problems when producing
smallpox virus are greater than those when pro-
ducing bacteria such as B. anthracis or Y. pestis. On
the other hand, very small quantities of smallpox
virus could initiate an epidemic in today’s world,
where the population at large is not vaccinated
and limited amounts of vaccines are available [5].
S W E D I S H P R E P A R E D N E S S
Swedish preparedness is based on the same prin-
cipals as those applicable when combating natural
epidemics [3]. It is probable that the first signs of a
bioterrorist attack will appear in the same way as
when new or changed patterns of infectious dis-
ease are identified. General practitioners and/or
infectious disease physicians in hospitals will
probably be the first to notice a new pattern of
disease. These doctors will have noticed unusual
cases or an unusual number of cases with the same
symptoms. They will notify the County Medical
Officer in charge of infectious disease control, who
will investigate these cases, not least by a detailed
epidemiologic analysis. Meanwhile, this informa-
tion will also be forwarded to the Swedish Institute
of Infectious Disease Control. If the information
gained does not fit the usual pattern, further
investigations will be done by national and county
authorities. Necessary countermeasures will pri-
marily be the responsibility of the County Medical
Officer, with assistance from the national autho-
rities when necessary. Today, with these new
threats, it is even more important for the emer-
gency ward staff and general practitioners to
quickly respond to unusual incidences or
increased numbers of unusual cases and rapidly
report them to the County Medical Officer, in
order to enable a further investigation when
needed.
The recent management in Sweden of a large
number of suspect letters containing some kind of
powder, suspected to be anthrax, has shown that
Sweden has a fairly good capacity to handle this
kind of biological threat. It has also been a good
opportunity to evaluate our preparedness, both its
strong and weak points. The new maximum con-
tainment laboratory at the Swedish Institute for
Infectious Disease Control was used during this
time, and proved to be an important resource. A
review of the organization and capacity of the
regional clinical laboratories in Sweden with
respect to their preparedness for a larger bioter-
rorist incident is now needed.
In Sweden, every county (population approxi-
mately 400 000) has an infectious disease clinic
with containment facilities. In order to treat
patients with highly contagious serious infectious
diseases, Sweden has a special containment unit at
the university hospitals in Linko¨ping and Stock-
holm. Sweden also has a special field epidemiolo-
gic group that can be called upon to investigate
outbreaks of disease of different types, on both a
national and an international level. In Sweden, the
storage of antibiotics and vaccines has recently
been reviewed and upgraded, and there is a well
developed network linking all organizations
involved in handling a biological threat.
The Swedish Defence Research Agency Division
of NBC Defense analyzes the international devel-
opments and threats concerning biological weap-
ons and bioterrorism. The research is, among other
things, focused on the development of methods
and technology for detection/identification of and
protection against biological warfare agents. The
Swedish Defence Research Agency cooperates
with the Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease
Control with regard to identification of specific
biological warfare agents.
I N T E R N A T I O N A L M E A S U R E S
In order to counter threats of biological warfare or
bioterrorism, there is a need for more intensive
international cooperation for threat assessment
and planning, and also to enhance society’s aware-
ness. It is also important to limit the proliferation
of this type of knowledge to organizations/states
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that have an interest in acquiring an arsenal of
biological warfare agents and weapons.
In this context, it is important to bear in mind the
Soviet program for biological weapons, with about
10 000 highly qualified scientists. After the fall of
the Soviet Union, the economic resources for this
type of research in Russia were dramatically cut,
leaving many scientists unable to support, and
many have, in one way or another, found their
way to countries outside Russia. There is a them-
selves, temptation for these scientists to immigrate
to countries that want to acquire biological weap-
ons. In order to meet this threat, several initiatives
have been taken by the world community. An
example of this the Department of Defense Coop-
erative Threat Reduction Program (DOD CTR) in
the USA, as well as other US agencies. Economic
support is also given through the International
Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow
and the Science and Technology Center Ukraine
(STCU) in Kiev, which are financed by the USA,
the European Union (EU), Japan, and others. In
June 1999, the EU agreed on a common strategy for
Russia, which includes measures to limit the pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruction and
promote disarmament, support weapons control,
implement international treaties, and support
export controls. In Sweden, the Ministry for For-
eign Affairs has supported research cooperation
between the Swedish Defense Research Agency
(FOI), the Swedish Institute for Disease Control
(SMI) and the Scientific Research Institute Vector
in Novosibirsk, Russia in the areas of biosafety and
diagnostics.
Since the BTWC entered into force in 1975, work,
not least by Sweden, has been carried out in order
to strengthen the Convention with a control
regime. In 1994, it was agreed to start negotiations
on such a control system, and during the spring of
2001 the chairman presented a compromise final
text which should be the basis for termination of
the negotiations. This proposal consisted of,
among other things, an obligation to submit
annual declarations of specific biotechnology
activities, and the carrying out of 50–100 random
visits to such facilities in order to varify their
declarations. Another possibility was to carry
out challenge inspections in cases of suspicions
of a breech of the Convention [16]. All states except
the USA agreed to continue work on the chair-
man’s text. At the final session of the negotiations
in July 2001, the USA would not agree on a final
report of the negotiations to be forwarded to the
5th Review Conference of the BTWC, to be held in
Geneva in November 2001. This meant that the
negotiations collapsed. At the Review Conference,
the USA stated that it could not continue work on a
control regime based on the chairman’s text and
that the approach of the negotiations since 1994
had been wrong. The USA presented new propo-
sals, which gained limited support. There was no
agreement at the conference after three weeks of
negotiations, and the conference had to be post-
poned until November 2002. At present, it is not
possible to say when or if agreement on a control
mechanism for biological weapons will be possi-
ble. This is most unsatisfactory, as the threat from
biological weapons is more real than ever, and the
USA has been at the forefront in raising awareness
of this threat.
Many countries have initiated plans for hand-
ling a bioterrorism attack. In the USA, more than
120 major cities now have special teams that, 24 h
per day, can react to a suspected biological attack.
Stores of antibiotics and vaccines have been built
up, and recently the USA decided to acquire
smallpox vaccine for its entire population. In a
recent bill to Congress, three billion dollars were
requested to improve preparedness against bioter-
rorism. In the EU, work has now been initiated,
and discussions are underway concerning the
need to better coordinate preparedness against
bioterrorism [3]. At the EU Gent Summit of heads
of state in October 2001, a program was proposed
to improve preparedness against biological terror-
ism, which is now being developed, and includes
initiatives on research and public-health measures.
D I S C U S S I O N
Comparing Europe with other parts of the world,
it can be argued that the Middle East or the USA
are more likely to be targets for bioterrorism. Our
preparedness in Sweden and the rest of Europe
should be based on a realistic threat assessment
that will result in balanced countermeasures.
Strengthening the public-health and infectious
disease infrastructure is probably one of the most
effective steps towards averting the suffering that
could be wrought by terrorist use of biological
agents. International cooperation, not least in the
EU, must be enhanced. Effective disease surveil-
lance is an essential first step and is important in
helping infectious disease control personnel and
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law enforcement officials to react swiftly. In Eur-
ope, there is a need to improve the surveillance
system as well as improve the central coordination
[17]. Adequate epidemiologic and laboratory
capacity nationwide are prerequisites for effective
surveillance systems. Preparations must also
include plans for the rapid identification and char-
acterization of the agents involved. There is also a
need to further improve the network of qualified
laboratories on a European level, as no single
laboratory or country can have specialists on all
of the exotic diseases that can possibly be used as
biological warfare agents. The presence of a num-
ber of maximum biosafety (P4) laboratories in
different countries is important in the battle
against bioterrorism, since rapid diagnosis/iden-
tification of all possible microorganisms is neces-
sary. Examples of recently opened European
facilities are the Laboratoire P4 Jean Meureiux in
Lyon, France, and the Containment laboratories at
the Swedish Institute of Infectious Disease Control
in Stockholm, Sweden. Bioterrorism poses a for-
midable new challenge to the clinical microbiology
laboratory. Many of these do not possess the
capacity or expertise to detect and accurately
identify those biological agents classified as high
priority, like those causing anthrax, tularemia,
botulism, plague or smallpox [18]. Planning is also
required for emergency distribution of medical
supplies, especially antibiotics and vaccines. For
example, in the case of smallpox, it is essential to
rapidly identify those who might have been
infected and to vaccinate them as well as all
who might have come into contact with them.
At present, the stocks of vaccine in many countries
are very limited.
Coordination and communication also need to
be strengthened, to minimize response times. If a
bioterrorist event is suspected, established com-
munication must be among hospital personnel,
local and central healthcare departments, specia-
lized laboratories, central and regional authorities
for disease surveillance, and police and rescue
services. A biological attack will also require of
preservation evidence (at the scene of a crime), a
unified command system, and the need to protect
emergency responders against possible secondary
devices intentionally placed to maim or injure
them [19,20].
The management of the disease might not fol-
low normal procedures, since diagnostic labora-
tory confirmation might take too long. Instead, it
will be necessary to initiate a response based on the
recognition of high-risk syndromes. Epidemiolo-
gic principles must be used to assess whether a
patient’s presentation is typical of an endemic
disease or is an unusual event that should raise
concern [21]. There should also be specialist teams
on standby that can rapidly analyze any potential
threat and give recommendations to responsible
authorities. After an incident, there might be a
need for decontamination of the affected area,
depending on the type of agent and the quantity
released; this is also an area for international
cooperation, as expertise is not always available
in the country under attack. From a European
perspective, it can be questioned whether each
country can afford or be motivated to set up
qualified rapid response teams that could, at short
notice, be deployed to the scene of a bioterrorist
attack. Perhaps this could be one area for coopera-
tion between countries. What could be a realistic
goal for such teams in a European context? In the
area of research and development, to enhance our
knowledge of agents of concern and to develop
rapid methods for identification and detection of
agents, international cooperation is vital, given
today’s scarce economic resources. Another area
for cooperation across borders is the training of
personnel in handling situations involving the
threat or use of biological warfare agents.
Legislation has a central role in countermea-
sures, such as national legislation in line with
the BTWC. All countries that have not yet passed
domestic legislation making the treaty prohibi-
tions binding on their citizens and businesses
should be strongly pressured to do so as soon as
possible. It is also essential to break the recent
deadlock in the negotiations to strengthen the
BTWC with a control mechanism, and here the
scientific community has a responsibility to put
pressure on governments to create legislation con-
cerning control and further prolifecation as well as
storage, handling, transfers of highly pathogenic
microorganisms. There is a proposal to instate
legislation that could impose liability on anyone
who publishes recipes for producing chemical or
biological agents [22]. There has also been a pro-
posal to make the possession of biological weap-
ons a crime under international law, which could
facilitate the prosecution of those who possess
biological warfare agents and the means to deliver
them [23]. Steps could be taken in order to curb
terrorism activities by agreeing to initiate negotia-
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tions on a multilateral convention banning biolo-
gical and chemical terrorism.
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